A TEE is a hardware-isolated area of a processor that runs code in a secure enclave. Even the server operator cannot access data inside the enclave. AWS Nitro Enclaves, which Maple uses, strip away all external access: no SSH, no admin console, no persistent storage outside the enclave. The only way in or out is through a narrow, measured communication channel.
Is this the same technology Apple uses for iCloud?
Similar concept, different implementation. Apple's Private Cloud Compute uses custom silicon with Secure Enclave. Maple uses AWS Nitro Enclaves with attestation-verified code. Both approaches use hardware isolation to ensure that even the service operator cannot access user data during processing.
How does cross-device sync work if everything is encrypted?
Your account has its own private key derived from your credentials. Chat history is encrypted with this key before leaving your device and stored in encrypted form on our servers. When you log in on another device, your key is re-derived and used to decrypt your data locally.
Who do I actually have to trust?
Your trust assumptions are minimal and verifiable:
Hardware: AWS Nitro hardware performs as documented (independently audited).
Code: The open-source code running in the enclave does what it says (you can audit it).
Attestation: The cryptographic proof on this page confirms the running code matches the published source.
Can I verify all of this myself?
Yes. Our server code is open source . The attestation document on this page is fetched live from our enclave and verified against AWS's root certificate. You can independently reproduce the build, compare the PCR0 hash, and confirm that the code running in production matches the published source.